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A HALACHIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
Recently, several news events have given rise to a

renewed interest in parent-child testimonial privileges.
First, the parents of Amy Grossberg refused to testify
against their daughter, a teenager accused of killing her
newborn baby.' Then, Monica Lewinsky's mother suffered
an anxiety attack while testifying before a grand jury that
was investigating a sexual relationship between her
daughter and President Clinton.2 The grand jury testimony
of Monica Lewinsky's mother gave rise to public sympathy
and questions about how a prosecutor can force a mother to
choose between betraying her daughter or lying under oath.3

This was followed by interest in the Senate about a possible
1

See Matthew Futterman, Grossbergs"'Jewish Law' Shield Challenged, STAR-

LEDGER, Dec. 4, 1997, at 049; Matthew Futterman, Grossberg's ParentsMust Give
Testimony, STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 24, 1998, at 013; Doug Most, A Court Has Ears
Inside the Home: Parent-ChildSecrets Not Safe, RECORD, Dec. 7, 1997, at A01; Doug
Most, ProsecutorsChallengingGrossbergs on Immunity Experts Doubt They'll Avoid
Testifying, RECORD, Nov. 25, 1997, at A01; GrossbergDefense: No Quizzing Parents
Motion Seeks to Block Prosecutors, RECORD, Nov. 23, 1997, at A05; Grossberg's
ParentsAsk Court to Keep Family Talks Confidential, STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 26, 1997,
at 043.
2 See Richard T. Cooper et al., Lewinsky's Mother Leaves Distraught After
Testimony Probe: Marcia Lewis Ends Second Day Before Federal Grand Jury
InvestigatingAlleged Affair Involving Clinton, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A16;
Richard T. Cooper et al., Monica's Mom, the Reluctant Starr Witness Controversy,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at El; Thomas Galvin & Tara George, Long Grilling
Leaves Monica Mom Teary, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1998, at 5; Jerry Seper,
Lewinky's Mom Cites 'Hell' of Testimony, Requests Delay, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1998, at A6; Jerry Seper, Lewinsky's Mother Can't Finish Testimony, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1998, at Al.
3 See Ruth Ann Leach, Why Doesn't Monica's Mom Refuse to Testify?,
NASHVILLE BANNER, Feb. 17, 1998, at All (suggesting that Marcia Lewis should
have refused to testify and face imprisonment rather than violate "the precious
bonds of trust she enjoys with her child"); Ruth Marcus, Starr Pushing Envelope,
Former Prosecutors Say Grilling Lewinsky's Mom is Perfectly Legal and a Tactic
Justice Officials Often Use, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 1998, at 1; Eric Zorn,
With Ma on Stand, Lawyers Can Mine the Mother Lode, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1998, at
1 (commenting on the "crazy" inconsistency in the law which protects spousal
communications but not confidences to parents).
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"parent-child immunity" bill that would allow parents to
refuse to testify against their children.'
The idea of a parent-child privilege, however, is not
new. In fact, it was recognized almost three thousand years
ago in Jewish Law. Several commentators have suggested
that the justifications for allowing a spousal privilege,
preserving family unity and privacy, are the same
justifications for allowing a parent-child privilege. Almost
every state and the federal system recognize a privilege as
to communications between spouses. Only four states5 and
one federal district,6 however, have recognized any sort of
testimonial privilege between parents and children.
Part I of this Note discusses the disqualification of
parents and children as witnesses as it existed in Jewish
Law.
Part II briefly outlines existing privileges in
American Law. Part III discusses how American courts
have considered claims of privilege between parents and
children. Finally, this Note concludes that a parent-child
privilege utilizes the same rationale underlying the widely
recognized spousal privileges. American courts have been
reluctant to extend privilege to the parent-child relationship
because, unlike the spousal privilege, it was not recognized
in the common-law.
Courts considering a parent-child
privilege have been, thus far, unwilling to explore other
4 See William Satire, Privilege Proliferation,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998,
at A29.
On February 12, 1998, lawyers from the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers announced that it would draft a bill proposing a parent-child privilege. See
David E. Rovella, One StarrSubpoena Awakens the Defense Bar, NATL L.J., Mar. 2,
1998. Representative Daniel Burke, a democrat from Illinois, is sponsoring a bill
that would prevent parents from being forced to testify against their children as to
confidential communications in non-criminal proceedings. See Dennis Conrad,
Reacting to Lewinsky's Mother's Testimony, Lawmaker Offers a Bill, ASSOCIATED
PRESS POL. SERVICE, Mar. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7397938. In February, a
New Jersey state senator proposed a state bill to restrict prosecutors from
compelling parents to testify against their children. See Kathy Barrett Carter,
Democrats Seek Ban on Prosecutors Pitting Parents Against Kids: Family
Communications Would be Privileged,STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 24, 1998, at 029.
6 New York is the only state to have judicially permitted parents and children
to claim a parent-child privilege. Three other states, Idaho, Minnesota, and
Massachusetts have statutes that permit parents or children to assert the privilege.
See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (Law. Co-op.
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN § 595.02(1)j) (West 1999). For further discussion, see infra
notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing In re Agosto, 553 F.
Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983)).
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legal systems as possible sources from which to derive a rule
to protect familial relationships. The related-witnesses rule
in Jewish law can provide courts with a historical source to
consider in weighing the needs of the state and the integrity
of familial relationships.
PART I - THE RULE IN JEWISH LAW
Jewish law is derived from three basic sources: the
Torah, exegetical interpretation, and logic and observation.'
The Torah was revealed to Moses at Mt. Sinai in both
written and oral form.' It is comprised of the Five Books of
Moses 9 and the Oral Law." The Oral Law, which interprets
and supplements the written Torah, was transmitted as an
oral tradition to each generation." The Oral Law contains
rules for the application of Torah law, halachah, and
historical and moral narrative, aggadah.
The Mishnah was the earliest authoritative codification
of Oral Law. 3 The Talmud, containing detailed commentary
and debate on the Mishnah, was completed around 500
C.E.'"
The Talmud is the most influential source of
' See Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional
Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 447-48

(1997).
8 See DAVID FELDMAN,
The Structure of Jewish Law, in CONTEMPORARY
JEWISH ETHICS 21 (1978); Levine, supra note 7, at 444-45.

' Torah shebikh'tav. See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 21.
Torah sheb'alpeh. See id.
" See IRVING BREITOWITZ, Sources of Jewish Law, in BETWEEN CIVIL AND
10

RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, 307 (1993);

Levine, supra note 7, at 445 n.17.
12 See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 22.
*8The Mishnah was compiled by R. Judah the Patriarch of Palestine around
200 C.E. See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 22; AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, A Historical
Sketch of the Sources of Jewish Law, in EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW: FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH CIVIL LAW 289, 290
(1991) [hereinafter KIRSCHENBAUM, SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW]. The Mishnah

recorded some differing opinions among authorities interpreting halachah and is by
no means a complete codification of the Oral Law. See BREITOWITZ, supra note 11,
at 308.
" The Talmud is a legal work that contains debate, discussion, and analysis,
called G'mara.See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 23. These debates occurred primarily
in the academies of Babylonia. See id. Contemporaneously to the development of the
Babylonian G'mara, commentary and teachings of the Sages were recorded in
Palestine. See id. Thus, the commentary on the Mishnah that developed in
Palestine is termed the "Palestinian Talmud," or Talmud Yerushalmi. See id.;
Levine, supra note 7, at 445 n.17. The Babylonian Talmud, Talmud Bavli, a far

108
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halachah from the oral tradition. Other sources of
commentary and codes of law, most notably the Code of
Maimonides, 5 the Tur,is and the Shulchan Aruch, 17 were
written after the completion of the Talmud. s Together,
these sources serve as guides for the practical application of
halachah.
The Oral Torah included hermeneutic principles,
interpretive techniques for deriving rules from the text of
the Torah.'9 Rules derived from the Torah or explicitly20
stated in the Torah carry the authority of the Torah itself.
There is at least one difference, however, between derived
and stated rules. Rules of conduct, mitzvot, which are
more comprehensive work, is the authoritative source of Jewish Law. See FELDMAN,
supra note 8, at 24; BREITOWITZ, supra note 11, at 308; Levine, supra note 7, at 445
n.17.
15 Maimonides, Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon (Rambam) (b. 1135-d. 1204), wrote
the Mishne Torah as a comprehensive, practical handbook for halachic application.
See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 26-27.
" Tur is the common name of the Arba'ah Turim, or "The Four Rows." See
BREITOWITZ, supra note 11, at 311; FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 29-30;
KIRSCHENBAUM, SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 13, at 300. These four books
were written by Rabbi Yaakov Ben Asher (b. 1275-d. 1340), the son of Rosh. See
infra note 18. The Tur was unique in that it incorporated decisions from both the
German and the French schools of thought. See BREITOWITZ, supra note 11, at 311.
17 The Shulchan Aruch is currently regarded as the leading code of Orthodox
Jewish Law. See BREITOWITZ, supra note 11, at 311; KIRSCHENBAUM, SOURCES
OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 13, at 300. This work was prepared by R. Yosef Karo (b.
1488-d. 1575), as an abridgement of his Bait Yosef, a comprehensive commentary
and analysis of the Tur. See BREITOWITZ, supra note 11, at 311; FELDMAN, supra
note 8, at 31. R. Karo, a Sephardi, relied heavily on Sephardic authorities. See
KIRSCHENBAUM, SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 13, at 300-01. Only after
Rabbi Isserles of Poland supplemented the Shulhan Aruch with Ashkenazic
commentary did R. Karo's code become widely accepted. See id. at 301.
18 There are several widely used works that were written
from the completion of
the Talmud to the present day. Among those of influential authority are
commentaries by Rabbi Shlomo Ben Yitzchak (Rashi, 1040-1105) of France. See
BREITOWITZ, supra note 11, at 309; FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 25; KIRSCHENBAUM,

SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW, supra, note 13, at 298. Further commentaries
supplementing Rashi, are termed Tosafot. See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 25-26.
Other influential scholars during the middle ages were R. Isaac Alfasi (Rif) (d.
1103); Nahmanides, R. Moses Ben Nahman (Ramban) (b. 1195-d. 1270); R. Solomon
ben Adret (Rashba) (b. 1215-d. 1310); and Asheri, R. Asher Ben Yeheil (Rosh) (b.
1250-d. 1327). See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 28-29; KIRSCHENBAUM, SOURCES OF
JEWISH LAW, supra note 13, at 298-301.
'9 See Levine, supra note 7, at 445. For a detailed discussion of specific
hermeneutic principles in Jewish Law interpretation, see Bernard Rosensweig, The
Hermeneutic Principlesand TheirApplication, 13 TRADITION 49 (1972).
'0 See id. Rules with the authority of the Torah are termed d'oraita.See id.
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expressly stated in the Torah without discussing the
underlying rationale, may not be limited or disregarded
based on a belief that the rationale for the rule no longer
applies.2 ' At the same time, if the rationale for the rule is
expressly stated in the Torah, then application of that rule
can be limited to the rationale for the rule.22 On the other
hand, for rules that are derived from the Torah through
extensive interpretation, the rationale for the rule may act
to expand or restrict the scope of that rule."
The procedural rule in Jewish Law that prevented
family members from testifying was derived from a passage
of the Torah, which states, "[tihe fathers shall not be put to
death for the children, neither shall the children be put to
death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for
his own sin. "24 This was interpreted to prohibit all relatives,
including spouses, parents, and children, from testifying
against one another.25 The Talmud notes that the rationale
21

See Levine, supra note 7, at 458-60.

2 See id. at 460-61.
2 See id. at 463.
24

Deut. 24:16. This passage is also cited as the basis for the proscription

against self-incrimination, since "a man is related to himself." See AARON
KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 40-41 (1970) [hereinafter
KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION]; 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 587 (1996)
(citing San. 9b-10a; Yev. 25b); Norman Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its
Equivalent in the Halakhah, 5 JUDAISM 53 (1956); Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 955 (1988).
21 See 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 587 (1996) (citing
Yad, Edut 13:1). As
between parents and children, see id. (citing Sif. Deut. 280; Sanh. 27b). "The
Mishnah lists as disqualified relatives: father, brother, uncle, brother-in-law,
stepfather, father-in-law, and their sons and sons-in-law (Sanh. 3:4); the rule was
extended to cover nephews and first cousins (Yad, Edut 13:3; Sh.Ar., HM 33:2).
Where the relationship is to a woman, the disqualification extends to her husband
(Yad, Edut 13:6; Sh.Ar., HM 33:10)." 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 587 (1996)
(citations in original).
In the small, closely knit, Jewish communities of the Middle Ages, almost every
member of the community was related to one another in some form. See 2
MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 737 (1994). Since
the rule disqualified all witnesses from testifying either against or in favor of their
kinsmen, many communities adopted local enactments that permitted the testimony
of relatives. See id. These enactments were supported in responsum by Rashba and
Asheri. See id. at 737-39. This view was adopted in the Shulhan Arukh, which
stated; "[uit is the current practice to accept witnesses from the community with
regard to their enactments and decrees, charitable endowments, and all other
matters; and they are competent to testify even as to their relatives, since it has
become accepted that they may testify." Id. at 739 (quoting Sh. Ar. HM 37:22). Note,

39 CATHOLIC LAWYER, Nos. 2-3

for this rule was not based on the fear that family members
would testify falsely.2" Indeed, it is a single comprehensive
rule that protects all family members from having to testify
in matters concerning their relatives. Jewish law prevented
disturbances that occur when family members are called to
testify against their loved ones. By not permitting family
members to testify at all, the Jewish rule also prevented the
trier of fact from drawing any negative inferences when a
family member refused to testify in favor of a defendant.
The rule in Jewish law reflects a choice by a society to
favor the sanctity of the family over the fact-finding need of
the government. This procedural rule, which predates the
common-law, was not adopted in the United States.
Instead, American courts extend a far more limited
protection to individuals whose family members are accused
of wrongdoing.
PART II - PRIVILEGES IN AMERICAN LAW

American
courts
recognize
several
testimonial
privileges. The common-law recognized only the spousal
and attorney-client privileges.27 Wigmore, whose treatise on
evidence is frequently cited by courts, requires four
conditions be satisfied before a privilege will arise. These
are:
(1) The communications must originate in confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full

and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greaterthan the benefit thereby
however, that the situations posed to Rashba and Asheri were monetary matters in
localities that had adopted enactments permitting testimony by related witnesses.
See id. at 737-39. Thus the rule disqualifying relatives from testimony remained
part of the Shulhan Aruch. See 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 587 (1996) (citing Sh.
Ar., HM 33:2; Sh. Ar., HM 33:3; Sh. Ar. HM 33:10).
26 See KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION, supra note 24, at 40.
27 See Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (1580); Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng.
Rep. 33 (1577).
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gained for the correct disposal of litigation.2
In the federal system, Rule 50129 provides a basis for
recognizing privileges that are not otherwise explicitly
stated in the Federal Rules.
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary
privilege that was recognized by common law. 30 The right of
the barrister not to disclose his client's secrets was derived
from a "gentleman's" oath and honor.3 This rationale was
later replaced by the view that a privilege of confidentiality
promotes full disclosure by the client, which is essential to
the attorney's ability to effectively represent the client,
outweighing the state's interest in seeking the truth." The
privilege has long been recognized in every jurisdiction in
the United States3 3 and is now considered to be a required
28

8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton 1961).

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
soSee 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2290; Ann M. Stanton, Child-Parent
Privilegefor Confidential Communications:An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 7 (1982).
31 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2286, at 530-31.
12 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 313-15 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed.
1992); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2290, at 542. Perhaps the most concise yet
complete rationale for the privilege is the statement that:
Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may be pursued
too keenly--may cost too much. And, surely the meanness and the
mischief of prying into a man's confidential consultations with his legal
adviser, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness,
and suspicion and fear, into those communications which must take place,
and which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place
uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for the truth itself.
Daniel R. Coburn, Child-ParentCommunications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L REV. 599, 605 (1970) (quoting Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & Sm.
28-29 (1846)).
" See Coburn, supra note 32, at 604; Comment, FunctionalOverlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals:Its Implicationsfor the PrivilegedCommunications
Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227 (1962); Stanton, supra note 30, at 9. Six
jurisdictions, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
29
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ethical responsibility."
Only the client may claim the
privilege, which is only established upon a showing that
there existed an attorney-client relationship,"5 there was a
communication,36
and that the communication
was
confidential.3 7 Some courts have also noted constitutional
grounds supporting the privilege in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.38
The physician-patient relationship was not recognized
in the common law. 39 The first state to recognize such a
privilege was New York, in 1828.40 The underlying rationale
for the privilege is to promote patient disclosure by
shielding them from possible embarrassment or invasion of
privacy, and thus allow physicians to accurately diagnose
and treat their illnesses.4'
South Carolina, and Virginia, judicially recognize the attorney-client privilege. Most
states have codified the privilege in statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122234 (West 1994); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 954-62 (Deering 1998 & Supp. 1999); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(b) (1998); HAwAII REV. STAT. ANN. § 503(b) (Michie
1995); IDAHO. CODE § 9-203.2 (1998); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998);
MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-108 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20
(West 1994); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060(2) (West Supp. 1999).
3' See AMERICAN BAR FOUND., ANN. CODE OF PROF. RESP., CANON 4(1979).
35 See Keir v. State, 11 So.2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1943); MCCORMICK, supra note 32,
§
88 at 322; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, §§ 2294-2304 (detailing the situations in
which the privilege does and does not apply).
36 See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, § 89 at 327; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, §§
2306-09 (distinguishing between communications and acts for purposes of applying
the privilege).
3' See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, § 91 at 333; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, §§
2311-16 (detailing what types of information will be considered confidential and
under what circumstances).
38 See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
" See Jeffrey Begens, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An
Absolute Right or an Absolute Privilege?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 709, 712 (1986)
(citing Franklin v. State, 258 A.2d 767, 771 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969)).
40 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2380 at 819-20 (citing 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat.
1828, 406 (pt. 3, c. 7, art. 9, § 73)).
41 See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, § 98 at 369 ("The
rationale traditionally
asserted to justify suppression in litigation of material facts learned by a physician
is the encouragement thereby given to the patient freely to disclose all matter which
may aid in the diagnosis and treatment of disease and injury."). Wigmore, however,
criticizes this justification. Applying the four requirements of privilege, see supra
note 28 and accompanying text, Wigmore argues that apart from venereal disease
and abortion, most people openly describe the facts of their illnesses in great detail.
See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2380a at 829. Furthermore, Wigmore does not
believe disclosure of confidential communications would actually deter patients from
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The priest-penitent relationship, though not protected
at common-law,4" is now protected by statute in most
states.43
In order for the privilege to be asserted, the
penitent must have intended for the communication to be
confidential"" and that the communication was made to an
ordained clergyman.'
In American law, there are two dimensions of marital
privileges. First, some statutes either provide a right to
refuse or disqualify spouses from giving adverse testimony
against the other spouse. 4"
Second, many jurisdictions
recognize
a
privilege
that
protects
confidential

seeking assistance of physicians. See id at 831-32. Thus, according to Wigmore, the
injury to the physician-patient relationship does not outweigh the interests of the
state. See id. at 830.
412 See WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2394
at 869 (finding that post-Restoration
courts declined to recognize any privilege as to confessions). In pre-sixteenth
century England, however, ecclesiastical law and secular law were so intertwined
that English courts likely gave deference to the need for confidentiality. See 2 SCOTT
N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 6.01 (2d ed. 1995).
" See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2395 at 873. For state statutes, see id.
(Supp. 1991) (citing, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122233 (West 1982); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.
505 (1980); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 8-803 (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(c) (West Supp. 1999); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
TEX. R. EVID. 505 (1982); VT. R. EVID. 505 (1983)).
" See Begens, supra note 39, at 713. But see People v. Brown, 368 N.Y.S.2d 645
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (finding that defendant's statement to his minister was privileged,
even though overheard by police).
Proposed Rule 506(b) provided: "[a] person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the
person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual advisor." 2 STONE &
TAYLOR, supra note 42, § 6.04 (quoting PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 506(b)). While the
proposed federal rule defined a clergyman as "a minister, priest, rabbi, or other
similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed
so to be by the person consulting him," id. (quoting PROPOSED FED. R. EVID.
506(a)(1)), states vary as to what they consider to be a "clergyman." See id. § 6.05.
46 Most states apply this rule only in criminal cases. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR,
supra note 42, § 5.02. This rule takes several forms: (1) absolute disqualification,
recognized in Hawaii, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wyoming; (2) disqualification
but allowing testimony upon consent of the non-witness spouse, recognized in
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, and New Jersey; (3) a power to prevent the spouse
from giving adverse testimony, recognized in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia; or (4) a privilege not to testify
adversely against one's spouse, recognized in Federal courts, Alabama, California,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Utah. See id.
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communications made within the marital relationship.
Interestingly,
the early
common-law
protection
extended to spouses was very similar to the protection in
Jewish Law. In Jewish Law, family members, including
spouses, were not permitted to testify in judicial
proceedings.48
At common-law, spouses were entirely
disqualified from testifying either for or against each
other. 9 This rule could not be waived by agreement or
dissolution of the marriage."
In Trammel v. United States,5 the Supreme Court
recognized a shift in the development of the spousal
privilege that limited the ability of the defendant to prevent
his or her spouse from testifying as to marital
communications.
In Trammel, the testimony of the
defendant's wife constituted almost the entirety of the
government's case against the defendant for conspiracy to
import heroin. 2
The defendant claimed that spousal
privilege should have permitted him to prevent his wife's
testimony from being used against him. 3
The Court

' See id. § 5.01. In federal court and many states, both spouses are granted a
privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent the other spouse from disclosing
confidential communications. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12-2232 (West 1994); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 980 (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(a) (1998); DEL. UNIF.
R. EVID. 504 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-504 (West 1999); IDAHO CODE § 9-203.1
(1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595-02(a) (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1802 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295(1)(a)
(Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A84A-22 (West 1994); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502(b)
(McKinney 1992); OR. REV. STAT § 40.255(2) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN § 78-24-8(1)
(1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
5.60.060(1) (West Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE
ANN § 57-3-3 (Michie 1997); see also Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951)
(holding that "marital communications are presumptively confidential").
48 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the halachic
disqualification of related witnesses).
49 See 2 THOMAs STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
706 (2d. Amer. ed. 1828). The rationale for the prohibition against spouses testifying
on behalf of one another was based on the assumption that husband and wife's
interests were identical. See id. Testimony by spouses against one another was
proscribed by a public policy concern against distrust and dissention within the
household. See id.
w See id.
5' 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
52 See id. at 43.
3

See id. at 41-42.
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discussed its holding in Hawkins v. United States," where it
had held that the spousal privilege was "'a rule which bars
the testimony of one spouse against the other unless both
consent.' "" The Court found that "[wihen one spouse is
willing to testify against the other in a criminal
proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is
almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the
way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. " " The
Court thus modified the spousal privilege rule and held that
only the testifying spouse could assert the privilege against
giving adverse testimony.57
Lower courts have imposed some other limitations on
the spousal privilege. The privileged communication must
have been made during a valid marriage.' The privilege is
generally limited to verbal communications between
spouses, not acts. 9 A spouse may be prevented from
asserting the privilege if compelling testimony would be in
the best interests of a child.' Additionally, the testifying
spouse, not the defendant-spouse, can only assert the
Marital
testimony."
adverse
against
privilege
" 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78
(1958)). In Hawkins, the Court had justified the broad spousal privilege stating, "the
law should not force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and
wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences." Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 79.
" Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
6' See id. at 53.
" See United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997) (requiring
the defendant to prove that the communication with his former spouse occurred
prior to their divorce); United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 1995)
(prohibiting defendant from asserting marital privilege as to man she lived with for
25 years where the state of residence did not recognize common-law marriage);
State v. Walker, 691 A.2d 1341, 1358 (Md. 1997) (finding that spousal privilege
"does not preclude the admission of out-of-court statements made by [a] spouse prior
to the marriage"); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Mass. 1996)
(declining to extend spousal privilege to woman defendant had lived with for six
years).
See Emery v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that
privilege extends only to utterances, not acts). But see United States v. Babe, 128
F.3d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that intimate sex acts between marriage
partners may be protected by the marital communications privilege).
See People v. Eveans, 660 N.E.2d 240, 246-47 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (finding a
child interest exception to spousal privilege); Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1446 (applying child
interest exception for spousal testimony relating to abuse of a minor child, even
where neither spouse is the parent of that child).
61 See Knox, 124 F.3d at 1365; United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d
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"[clommunications ...

are presumed to be confidential,"'2

but the privilege is deemed to be waived if disclosed to third
parties.6
Many privileges currently accepted in the United States
are recognized in order to preserve the integrity of socially
desirable relationships. Some of those relationships, such
as the attorney-client, physician-patient, and priestpenitent, are protected in order to encourage individuals in
need of assistance to seek advice or treatment. Some
privileges are justified by the desire to shield
communications within some relationships from public
knowledge. This rationale, otherwise known as the privacy
argument, has been used as additional justification for the
spousal privileges and the physician-patient privilege. The
parent-child privilege can be justified under both rationales.
Children are encouraged to communicate with their parents
to seek advice and guidance. Preserving the confidentiality
of communications within this relationship is essential to
family unity and trust.
PART III - THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE IN AMERICAN LAW

A.

JurisdictionsThat Recognize a Privilege
New York is the only state to judicially recognize a
parent-child testimonial privilege. The leading New York
case is In re Application of A & M." The parents of the
defendant refused to testify in a grand jury proceeding as to
alleged admissions by their 16-year old son regarding his
involvement in an arson.' The parents claimed that the
communications with their son should be recognized as
1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Savage, 695 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997).
Savage, 695 A.2d at 824; see also United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1332
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the government bears the burden of defeating the
presumption that marital communications are made privately).
See Taylor, 92 F.3d at 1331 (upholding admission of telephone recording
under third party disclosure exception); State v. Clark, 570 N.W.2d 195, 203 (N.D.
1997) (finding privilege did not extend to police officer to whom wife repeated
defendant's statements).
403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th Dep't 1978).
See id. at 377.
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privileged since their son sought their guidance and counsel
The court agreed that "communications
in confidence."
made by a minor child to his parents within the context of
the family relationship may, under some circumstances, lie
within the 'private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.' "" The court acknowledged that parent-child
communications were not protected by any statutory
privilege, but stated:
It would be difficult to think of a situation which more
strikingly embodies the intimate and confidential relationship
which exists among family members than that in which a
troubled young person, perhaps beset with remorse and guilt,
turns for counsel and guidance to his mother and father. There
is nothing more natural, more consistent with our concept of
the parental role than that a child may rely on his parents for
help and advice.u
The court found that when the state attempts to intrude
upon familial relationships, which are constitutionally
protected by the right of privacy, it must show a legitimate
state purpose that will be carefully examined by the court.'
The court then concluded that the societal interest in
"protecting and nurturing the parent-child relationship"
outweighed the State's interest in finding fact.70 Thus the
parents, although required to appear before the grand jury,
could assert their constitutionally protected privacy when
questioned about confidential communications occurring
within the familial relationship of parent and child. 7
In the twenty years since In re A & M, New York courts
to some
privilege
have extended the parent-child
7 2 and have found that the privilege is not
grandparents
limited by the age of the child. 7 New York does, however,

67

See id.
Id. at 381 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).

68 Id. at 378.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 380.

71 See id. at 382.
7' See In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (Faro. Ct. Monroe County 1984)
(extending privilege to grandmother where she was the primary caretaker of the
juvenile and the juvenile had permanently resided with her for 15 years).
See People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (Westchester County Ct.
1979) (finding that the privilege protects an ongoing parent-child relationship and is
thus not limited by the age of either party).
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require that the communication be made "in confidence "and
7
for the purpose of obtaining support, advice or guidance. 4
Only one federal court has judicially recognized a
parent-child privilege. In In re Agosto,75 a son claimed he
would suffer irreparable harm if he were forced to testify
against his father before a grand jury.7" In considering the
son's privacy claim, the court stated, "the Supreme Court
has determined that there is a 'private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.' "7 The court noted, however,
that the realm of family privacy may be encroached when
the state can show a compelling state interest that
outweighs the interest in preventing intrusion by the state."'
Three other states have chosen to recognize a form of
parent-child privilege by statute. All three states limit this
right to minor children. Idaho79 and Minnesota' prohibit
14 In re Mark G., 410 N.Y.S.2d
464, 465 (4th Dep't 1978); see also People v.
Robertson, 539 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding that the defendant's
statements to his mother in the presence of police officers were not protected by the
parent-child privilege because the defendant did not intend for his communications
to be confidential); People v. Tesh, 508 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (2d Dep't 1986) (finding
that "the defendant's [ ]communications to his mother were made in the presence of
third parties, thus negating any assertion of a privileged communication"); People v.
Gloskey, 482 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (3d Dep't 1984) (requiring that the testifying witness
wishes to remain silent and that the context of the conversation "confirm an aura of
confidentiality").
76 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
76 Id. at 1299.
77 Id. at 1312 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
7 See id. at 1312.
79 Section 9-230(7) of the Idaho Code provides:
Any parent, guardian or legal custodian shall not be forced to disclose any
communication made by their minor child or ward to them concerning
matters in any civil or criminal action to which such child or ward is a
party. Such matters so communicated shall be privileged and protected
against disclosure; excepting, this section does not apply to a civil action or
proceeding by one against the other nor to a criminal action or proceeding
for a crime committed by violence of one against the person of the other,
nor does this section apply to any case of physical injury to a minor child
where the injury has been caused as a result of physical abuse or neglect
by one or both of the parents, guardian or legal custodian.
IDAHO CODE § 9-230(7) (1998).
80
Section 595.02(i) of the Minnesota Statutes provides:
A parent or the parent's minor child may not be examined as to any
communication made in confidence by the minor to the minor's parent. A
communication is confidential if made out of the presence of persons not
members of the child's immediate family living in the same household.
This exception may be waived by express consent to disclosure by a parent
entitled to claim the privilege or by the child who made the communication
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the state from forcing a parent to testify against his or her
child in both criminal and civil proceedings.
Lastly, in Massachusetts, the statute"' was passed in
response
to the decision
in
Three Juveniles v.
2
Commonwealth.
In Three Juveniles, the adolescent
children and parents objected to the compelled grand jury
testimony of the children against their father in a murder
investigation.m
A narrow majority rejected an absolute
privilege
permitting the children not to testify.84
Furthermore, the court declined to consider whether a
privilege existed as to confidential communications between
parents and children.' The dissenters, on the other hand,
would have recognized a privilege based upon public policy
grounds, finding that the "violence done to the child, the
damage to family unity, and the consequent injury to society
that may result from the State's coercing an unemancipated
minor to testify against a parent" outweighed the state's

or by failure of the child or parent to object when the contents of a
communication are demanded. This exception does not apply to a civil
action or proceeding by one spouse against the other or by a parent or child
against the other, nor to a proceeding to commit either the child or parent
to whom the communication was made or to place the person or property of
either under the control of another because of an alleged mental or
physical condition, nor to a criminal action or proceeding in which the
parent is charged with a crime committed against the person or property of
the communicating child, the parent's spouse, or a child of either the
parent or the parent's spouse, or in which a child is charged with a crime
or act of delinquency committed against the person or property of a parent
or a child of a parent, nor to an action or proceeding for termination of
parental rights, nor any other action or proceeding on a petition alleging
child abuse, child neglect, abandonment or nonsupport by a parent.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(i) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
81Chapter 233, section 20 of the Laws of Massachusetts provides:
An unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall not testify
before a grand jury, trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal
proceeding, against said parent, where the victim in such proceeding is not
a member of said parent's family and who does not reside in the said
parent's household. For the purposes of this clause the term "parent" shall
mean the natural or adoptive mother or father of said child.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1999).
8' 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983); see also Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and
Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 913 n.18 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Parent-ChildLoyalty].
8 See Three Juveniles, 455 N.E.2d at 1204.
See id. at 1207.
See id.
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interest in enforcing its criminal laws." The dissenters
believed that requiring a child to incriminate his or her
parent would be an "unrealistic demand" that would disrupt
the normal relationship between parent and child.87 The
dissenters found that both the privacy interest in the
family' and the societal interest in promoting the unity of
the family, as demonstrated in the recognition of a parentchild privilege, supported the extension of a parent-child
testimonial privilege. 9
The Massachusetts legislature
agreed. The statute it passed, however, does not permit a
parent to refuse to testify against his or her own child.'
B.

JurisdictionsThat Have Declined to Recognize a Privilege

The majority of U.S. jurisdictions have overwhelmingly
declined to extend any testimonial privilege to the parentchild relationship. Most notably, in Port v. Heard,9 the
court held the parents in contempt for refusing to testify
before a grand jury regarding the involvement of their92
seventeen-year-old son in a capital murder investigation.
The parents based their claim on two legal theories, privacy,
and free exercise of religion.93 The parents contended that
rabbinical law prohibited them from testifying against their
son. 94 The court found that Agosto and Greenburg were
"extreme departures from the traditional rule in federal
courts that, other than the spousal privilege, there is no
privilege which permits a person not to testify against his or
her family members."95 The court distinguished the parentchild relationship from the spousal relationship because
"only the most extraordinary events can ever destroy the
relations of parent and child, brother and sister," whereas
Id. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
81 See
id.
'0 The Massachusetts statute only addresses a situation where a minor child is
called to testify against a parent. The statute does not actually create a testimonial
privilege, but actually disqualifies the child as a witness. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
233, § 20; see also Note, Parent-ChildLoyalty, supra note 82, at 913.
91 594 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Tex. 1984), affd 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985).
See id. at 1216.
See id. at 1215.
See id. at 1218.
9' Id. at 1219.
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the marital relationship is easily dissolved." Apparently,
the court did not believe that helping convict one's own son
in a capital murder case was an "extraordinary event" that
could destroy the parents' relationship with their child. In
addressing the Port's equal protection argument, the court
applied a rational basis test because the distinction between
the spousal and parent-child relationships did "not involve
suspect
inherently
or
rights
fundamental
either
classifications."9 7 The court characterized the legislature's
omission of protecting the parent-child relationship as a
"policy" consideration
and
therefore
concluded
the
legislature's determination, in not considering a testimonial
privilege for parents and children, was reasonable.98
Several other courts have declined to extend a parentchild privilege, preferring instead to defer to the
legislature.9 9 Even where courts have found they could
judicially create a testimonial privilege, they have declined
In State v. Maxon,"° the Supreme Court of
to do so.
Washington found that it had the authority to judicially
establish a parent-child privilege, but found no state or
federal constitutional right of privacy that would require a
The court, upon applying the
parent-child privilege.''
01 2
such as the loss of
that
considerations
Wigmore test, found
valuable evidence outweighed the public policy arguments
in favor of a parent-child privilege.0 "
C.

Claiminga Parent-ChildPrivilege Under the Free-Exercise
Clause

A few courts have addressed claims of parent-child
privilege under Jewish Law.
In In re Grand Jury
96 Id.

97 Id. at 1220.
98 Id..

" See, e.g., Cissna v. State, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding no
statute recognizing a parent-child privilege, and therefore declining to recognize
such a privilege); People v. Dixon, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("[W~e
believe that recognition of a new privilege is best deferred to the Legislature."); In re
Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790, 791 (Vt. 1996) (finding that the state legislature
had not recognized a parent-child privilege).
10 756 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1988).
...See id. at 1301.
100

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

'0o

See Maxon, 756 P.2d at 1303.
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Proceedings (Greenburg),'°
a federal district court
recognized a conflict between compelling a mother to testify
against her daughter and the mother's ability to freely
exercise her religion."° The court distinguished Smilow v.
United States"° on the basis that the court in Smilow was
°
skeptical of the religious basis of the witness's claim.'O
While the Greenberg court declined to create a common law
parent-child privilege, it did recognize a limited privilege
under the First Amendment.'8
Recently, the parents of Amy Grossberg, a teen accused
of killing her newborn child, asserted both a parent-child
privilege and a free exercise of religion issue when
subpoenaed to testify about their daughter in her criminal
trial. 9 In addressing the claim of parent-child privilege,
the court followed the Third Circuit's holding in In re Grand
Jury"'° and declined to judicially recognize such a
privilege."' The Grossbergs then contended that compelled
testimony against their daughter would violate their beliefs
and freedom to exercise their religion under Jewish law."'
Distinguishing between the freedom to believe and the
freedom to act,"3 the court determined that since "the
Grossbergs' freedom to act, not their freedom to believe,...
is implicated by any testimony about their daughter,... the
Grossbergs' freedom to act must yield to the compelling
state interest in hearing everyone's evidence.""'
In these cases, parents have asserted that compelling
them to testify against their child violated their rights
under the Free Exercise Clause.
These cases are
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579 (D. Conn. 1982).

104

11

105

See id. at 582.

106 465 F.2d 802, 804 (2d Cir. 1971) (denying claim by witness that testifying
would result in "[dlivine punishment and ostracism from the Jewish Community").
' See Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. at 583.
108

09

See id. at 587.

See State v. Grossberg, Nos. IN96-12-0127 & IN96-12-0128, 1998 WL 117975

(Del. Super. Ct. Jan 23, 1998).
110 103 F.3d 1140 (3rd Cir. 1997).
.. See Grossberg, 1998 WL 117975, at *2 ("[A] basis for a parent-child
testimonial privilege has not been established.").
112 See id. at *3.

113See id. (citing In re Marriage of Gove, 572 P.2d 458, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977)).
114

Id.
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problematic because, as discussed above, even though the
rule in Jewish Law was widely recognized, the bar against
testimony does not necessarily rise to the authority of a
mitzvah. Moreover, permitting this claim for Jews but not
adherents to other religions could rise to the level of
government endorsement of Judaism and thus violate the
Establishment Clause.
D. Academic Discussionof a Parent-ChildPrivilege
Several commentators have argued in favor of
recognizing a parent child privilege. " ' Philip Kraft found
that these arguments typically fall into at least one of four
categories."' The first group of commentators argues that a
1'r See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 32, at 633 (proposing that compelling a
juvenile's parents to testify as to confidential communications infringes upon the
juvenile's constitutional rights); Bruce N. Lemons, From the Mouths of Babes: Does
the ConstitutionalRight of Privacy Mandate a Parent-ChildPrivilege?,1978 BYU L.
REV. 1002, 1029 (1978) (analyzing existing privileges and finding that "it simply
cannot be argued that the relationships now protected by the panoply of privilege
are more important to society... than the parent-child relationship"); Marianne E.
Scott, Comment, Parent-ChildTestimonial Privilege: Preservingand Protecting the
FundamentalRight to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901, 920 (1983) ("[U1t is
critical to a child's emotional and psychological development that he know that he
may explore his problems in an atmosphere of trust and understanding without fear
that his confidences will be revealed to others at a later time."); Stanton, supra note
30, at 67 (arguing that the benefits of a parent-child privilege will outweigh the
state's need for the evidence the testimony would otherwise provide); Wendy
Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary
Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 619-31 (1987) (proposing a model statute
allowing for both an adverse testimonial privilege and a confidential
communications privilege); Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, Note, To Tell or
Not to Tell? An Analysis of Testimonial Privileges: The Parent-Childand Reporter's
Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 163, 180 (1993) ("The parent-child
privilege enables the family institution to grow, and in turn, strengthens the love
and mutual trust between the parent and child."); Begens, supra note 39, at 735
("Adoption of a parent-child privilege ... is essential to maintaining open lines of
communication between a child and his or her parents, thus protecting family
harmony."); Note, Parent-ChildLoyalty, supra note 82, at 928 ("Compelling parents
and children to testify against each other is likely not only to rip apart families but
also to invite perjury and to reduce public respect for the judicial system."). See
generally Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1979) (arguing that today, given the high rates of divorce, a
privilege is most needed in order to foster communications with parents for
guidance and advice).
"6 See Philip Kraft, The Parent-ChildTestimonial Privilege: Who's Minding the
Kids?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 505, 510-16 (1985) (revealing these arguments to be either the
classic, evidentiary argument, the privacy argument, the repugnancy argument, or
the no-win argument).

39 CATHOLIC LAWYER, Nos. 2-3

parent-child privilege ought to be recognized because it
would satisfy the four conditions of the Wigmore test."' The
next group posits that a parent-child privilege can be based
on the constitutionally protected privacy interest.18 A third
argument for recognition of a parent-child privilege is that
it is simply repugnant to either force a child to betray his or
her parent or to force an unwilling parent to assist in the
prosecution of his or her child.'
Finally, there is the "nowin" argument which asserts that continued denial of a
testimonial privilege will result in perjury, refusals to
testify that lead to contempt charges, or the destruction of
the parent-child relationship.'20
Therefore, all but four states have chosen to place the
state's interest in obtaining evidence above the sanctity of
the parent-child relationship. Courts choosing to recognize
a parent-child privilege have largely based their reasoning
in the constitutional right of privacy. Most courts, however,
have overwhelmingly declined to extend any testimonial
privilege to protect communications between parents and
their children.
CONCLUSION

In contrast to American law, which draws the line of
privilege at marriage, Jewish law protected a much broader class
of family members. Thus we are presented with two legal
systems that stand on opposite ends of a spectrum measuring
the societal value placed on family relationships. While the rule
in Jewish law was much broader than any privilege that has
been suggested to American courts, it can serve as a historical
marker that could allow courts and legislatures to strike a more
equitable balance between the state's need for evidence and
fostering open communication within families.
Erica Smith-Kocek
117 See WIGMORE, supra note 28, at 2285; Kraft, supra note
116. See generally
Coburn, supra note 32; Lemons, supra note 115; Levine, supra note 115; Stanton,
supra note 30.
118 See Kraft, supra note 116, at 512-14. See generally Lemons, supra note 115;
Levine, supra note 115; Stanton, supra note 30.
119See Kraft, supra note 116, at 514-15.
120 See id. at 515-16 (citing Clark, Questioning the Recognition of a ParentChild Testimonial Privilege, 45 ALB. L. REV. 142 (1980)).

